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UNITED STATES of America upon the relation for the Use
of the TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
v.
TWO TRACTS OF LAND Containing a Total of 146.4 ACRES,
MORE OR LESS, IN LOUDON COUNTY, TENNESSEE, et al.
Civ. A. No. 7428.
United States District Court, E. D. Tennessee, N. D.
June 10, 1974.
On Motion to Reconsider June 26, 1974.
*320 Robert H. Marquis, Gen. Counsel, Beauchamp E. Brogan, Associate Gen.
Counsel, Beverly S. Burbage, senior trial atty., Tennessee Valley Authority,
Knoxville, Tenn., for plaintiff.
J. Granville Clark, Russellville, Ky., W. P. Boone, Dougherty, Knoxville, Tenn., for
defendants.
ORDER
ROBERT L. TAYLOR, District Judge.
This is a condemnation proceeding under the Tennessee Valley Authority Act of
1933, 16 U.S.C. §§ 831-831dd, in which T.V.A. seeks to condemn defendants'
property for use in the construction, operation, and maintenance of the Tellico
Dam and Reservoir project.
Defendants contend in their answer that (1) the property which TVA seeks to
condemn will not in fact be used for the Dam and Reservoir project, (2) that the
taking by T.V.A. is unconstitutional and (3) T.V.A. has abused its discretion and
"is acting arbitrarily, capriciously, and in bad faith in said proposed taking." The
case is presently before the Court on plaintiff's motion for judgment on the
pleadings or for summary judgment. It is the opinion of the Court that defendants'
contentions with respect to the propriety of this taking are without foundation
either in law or fact. See generally, Environmental Defense Fund v. Tennessee
Valley Authority, 371 F.Supp. 1004 (E.D.Tenn.1973), aff'd, 492 F.2d 466, 468 (6th
Cir. 1974) (multi-purpose project, including shoreline development). See also
United States v. Welch, 327 U.S. 546, 553-554, 66 S.Ct. 715, 90 L.Ed. 843 (1946)
(the authority may condemn "all property [it] deems necessary"); Berman v.
Parker, 348 U. S. 26, 33, 75 S.Ct. 98, 99 L.Ed. 27 (1954); Tennessee Valley
Authority v. Kinzer, 142 F.2d 833 (6th Cir. 1944); Goodpasture v. Tennessee
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Valley Authority, 434 F.2d 760, 763 (6th Cir. 1970); Illinois Central R. R. v.
Tennessee Valley Authority, 455 F.2d 308 (6th Cir. 1971).
Accordingly, it is ordered that plaintiff's motion be, and the same hereby is,
granted.
ON MOTION TO RECONSIDER
ORDER
Before the Court is defendants' motion for the Court to reconsider and vacate its
previous order of June 10, 1974 granting plaintiff Tennessee Valley Authority's
motion for summary judgment.
In defendants' original answer, he contended that:
1. The property Tennessee Valley Authority sought to condemn was not intended
to be used in the construction, operation and maintenance of the Tellico Dam and
Reservoir.
2. There exists no authority under the Tennessee Valley Authority Act for plaintiff
to take private property for purposes not set forth in the Act.
3. Tennessee Valley Authority's acquisition and condemnation program was
tantamount to "rural renewal" — a program, defendant claims, which is analogous
to "urban renewal" and one that Tennessee Valley Authority has no statutory
authority to effect.
4. Tennessee Valley Authority acted arbitrarily and capriciously in its taking.
5. Tennessee Valley Authority's taking in this instance is without statutory
authority.
Defendants in their brief have reduced their contentions to two: First, *321 that
there exists judicial authority for the proposition that TVA's authority and purpose
in condemning a parcel of land is subject to judicial review. United States v.
Welch, 327 U.S. 546, 66 S. Ct. 715, 90 L.Ed. 843 (1946); United States v. Carmack,
329 U.S. 230, 67 S.Ct. 252, 91 L.Ed. 209 (1946), and secondly that TVA's taking in
this particular instance is arbitrary and capricious since, under defendants'
contentions, TVA proposed to condemn defendants' land presently and ultimately
resell the same at a later date to private persons. Defendants contend that any
profit realized in this condemnation and subsequent resale procedure would be
used to defer the costs of the Tellico project. Defendants further contend that this
resale is not incidental to the public benefit and, therefore, distinguishable from
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 75 S.Ct. 98, 99 L.Ed. 27 (1954), where the
Supreme Court concluded that:
". . . Once the object is within the authority of the Congress, the means
by which it will be attained is also for Congress to determine. Here one
of the means chosen is the use of private enterprise for redevelopment
of the area. Appellants argue that this makes the project a taking from
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one businessman for the benefit of another businessman. But the
means of executing the project are for Congress and Congress alone to
determine, once the public purpose has been established." 348 U.S. at
33, 75 S.Ct. at 103.
The Court has carefully examined the facts and law before it and concludes that,
while defendants are correct in their proposition that TVA's action is in fact
subject to judicial review, it cannot say that TVA is presently acting in an arbitrary
and capricious manner simply because the property presently being condemned
may ultimately be resold to a private party at some future date.
The Court, having sat in previous review of this project, cannot conclude that the
industrial development of the region surrounding the Tellico flood-line is so
remote from the project's purpose as to be designed for profit making purposes
alone. See generally, Environmental Defense Fund v. Tennessee Valley Authority,
371 F.Supp. 1004 (E.D. Tenn.1973), aff'd, 492 F.2d 466 (6th Cir. 1974). Contrary
to defendant's argument and his supporting affidavit Congress' object in its
acquisition and resale program was founded upon public purpose:
"The plan to acquire key lands for industrial and recreation
development and resell them as demand for such property increases
reflects the public purpose of the project in meeting the serious need
for measures to speed growth in employment in this part of eastern
Tennessee."
While defendant argues that industrial growth is not needed in this region, it is
not this Court's position to reappraise the wisdom of congressional policy in this
regard. "The role of the judiciary in determining whether that power [of eminent
domain] is being exercised for public purpose is an extremely narrow one."
Berman, supra, 348 U.S. at 32, 75 S.Ct. at 102. Cf. United States v. 544 Acres of
Land, 314 F.Supp. 273 (E.D. Tenn.1969).
Accordingly, it is ordered that defendants' motion be, and the same hereby is,
denied.
